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2001, 508 p. (Issledovanija novejšej russkoj istorii)
1 In the first volume of Dvesti let vmeste (1795-1995) (Two hundred years together) Aleksandr
Solzhenitsyn purports to present the first history of Russian-Jewish relations that is not
clouded  by  biases  in  favour  of  one  side  or  the  other.  Solzhenitsyn  claims  to  have
immersed himself in the literatures of both sides in order to write this book. Yet both his
sources and his conclusions are uneven and subjective. Indeed, without having looked at
even one book in the languages used by the vast majority of the pre-revolutionary Jewish
population of  Russia  (Yiddish and Hebrew),  Solzhenitsyn believes  that  “in this  book,
Jewish voices are heard more often than Russian.” (p. 5) This may be so, but the only
Jewish voices we hear speak in Russian.
2 The book is not really about two hundred years together, but rather about two hundred
years apart. Solzhenitsyn laments that Russian Jewry never fully assimilated into Russian
Orthodox  society,  and  for  this  he  blames  mostly  Jewish  separateness.  The  Jewish
population, he believes, never accepted tsarist offers of equality because they wanted to
retain their national separateness as well: “by equal rights the Jews understood something
more” (474). Despite repeated attempts by the Russian government to integrate the Jewish
population  into  its  fold, he  argues,  steady  Jewish  resistance  to  integration  led  to  a
radicalisation of the Jewish population. The basic structure of Solzhenitsyn’s argument,
together with many of its fallacies, is evident already in the first chapter. In this chapter,
which deals mostly with the eighteenth century, Solzhenitsyn argues that Russia under
Catherine the Great was one of the first European countries to give Jews “equal civil
rights, ” before even France and the German lands (37-38).  This assertion is based on
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Catherine’s  declaration  that  Jews  enrolled  as  merchants  or  townsmen  in  the  newly
annexed territories would be given the same rights as Christian members of these estates.
Yet  Solzhenitsyn neglects  to  mention that  Catherine’s  granting  of  the  legal  right  to
participate  in  municipal  elections,  although well-intentioned,  was  subverted  by  local
authorities.  Towns where there was a large Jewish population,  such as Vitebsk,  used
electors to ensure that not one Jew was elected to office. Further Solzhenitsyn asserts
that  the rights  extended to Jews were greater  than those extended to Russian serfs,
merchants and townsmen, making the Jews actually a privileged class.  That Jews had
greater rights than serfs is an accurate and often overlooked point, although it was made
by Salo Wittmayer Baron half a century ago. However, Solzhenitsyn’s assumption that
Jews were more privileged than Russian merchants and townsmen since Jews who did not
actually live in towns were permitted to register as townsmen is mistaken. First of all,
there were also many Christians who for various reasons were registered as townsmen
but did not actually live in towns. More importantly, though, the “right” for non-urban
dwellers  to  register  as  townsmen was  hardly  a  blessing.  For  soon after  the  law was
promulgated, B. D. Passek, the governor-general of Belorussia, began forcibly relocating
Jews from the rural shtetls in which they had resided for generations into towns.
3 Although Solzhenitsyn is right to point out that Catherine’s early legislation regarding
the Jews was not discriminatory in intent, he errs in neglecting the implementation of the
law. Further the sheer number of laws relating to the Jews, complete with contradictions
and inconsistencies, is simply too complex to warrant the type of sweeping judgments
made by Solzhenitsyn.  It  is  ironic  that  Solzhenitsyn,  who spent  eight  years  in penal
labour camps for expressing his opinions yet lived in a state with a constitution that
provided for freedom of speech and freedom of conscience,  would accept Catherine’s
enactments at  face value.  Surely he would not  expect  his  readers to be swayed into
believing  that  the  Soviet  Union  provided  for  fundamental  freedoms  with  a  citation
guaranteeing these rights from Article 125 of the 1936 Soviet Constitution. Yet, he expects
his readers to do just that in regard to tsarist promulgations.
4 The Jews, Solzhenitsyn argues, repeatedly frustrated governmental efforts to integrate
them by clinging to their own separateness, whether through the kahal (Jewish communal
council), the revolutionary movement, Zionism, or the establishment of Jewish self-help
organizations. Most often they accomplished this by using various cunning techniques to
evade the law, but in some cases they actively thwarted officialdom. For instance, when
Stolypin became the first  prime-minister to work honestly toward granting the Jews
equal rights, his fate was to be assassinated “at the hands of a Jew” (440). Solzhenitsyn
spends five pages discussing the effects that a Jew assassinating the prime-minister had
on Russia. This event, notably, also plays a significant role in Solzhenitsyn’s The red wheel.
Yet the question of whether or not Dmitrii Bogrov, Stolypin’s assassin, was actually a Jew
has yet to be conclusively answered. Certainly his roots were Jewish, but his grandfather
was a convert, and some historians have claimed that both he and his father converted as
well.  Further,  despite  reports  of  his  generally  benevolent  attitudes  toward the  Jews,
Stolypin did little to actually alleviate the restrictions imposed upon them.
5 In Solzhenitsyn’s opinion, it was not the Russians who excluded the Jews, but the Jews
who rejected the Russians.  This is most evident in his chapter on Zionism, where he
chastises  the  Zionists  and  other  Jewish  nationalists  for  excluding  themselves  from
Russian society (264). Yet after the Zionist movement decided in Helsingfors to take an
active  part  in  domestic  Russian  politics,  Solzhenitsyn  seems  to  support  Plehve’s
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condemnation of  the  movement  for  interfering in  domestic  affairs  (266).  Despite  his
admiration for certain aspects of Zionism, Solzhenitsyn condemns the movement first for
distancing itself from Russian politics and then for interfering in Russian politics.
6 One of the reasons Solzhenitsyn believes that Jews did not merge with their Russian co-
inhabitants  was  because  they  were  able  to  profit  from their  separateness.  In  fact,
Solzhenitsyn condemns the Jews for repeatedly profiting from the misfortunes of their
neighbours, from the Tatar yoke of the thirteenth century to the First World War. Jews
not only profited from Russia’s wars, but also from serfdom, court intrigues from Biron
to Rasputin,  and peasant drunkenness.  For instance,  he writes:  “But the greatest of
Alexander’s  reforms,  the  most  historically  important,  a  turning  point  in  Russian
history – the liberation of  the peasants,  the abolition of  serfdom in 1861 –  was  for
Russian Jews entirely disadvantageous and for many also ruinous” (147). Although he
does not go so far as to blame the Jews for these ills, thereby distancing himself from
radical anti-Semitism, the implication that Jews were not only immune from these ills
but actually profited from them sets up a binary model of Russians on one side and
Jews on the other.
7 Another ill for which Solzhenitsyn believes the Jews bear special responsibility is the
revolutionary  movement.  As  he  begins  his  discussion  of  the  Jewish  role  in  the
revolutionary  movement,  he  is  careful  to  note  that  many  Russians  were  also
revolutionaries (213),  but he implies that Jewish revolutionaries were of a different
genus.  For  instance,  why is  it  “interesting  to  note  that  almost  none  of  the  Jewish
revolutionaries of [the 1870s] came to the revolution from poverty and destitution; the
majority  were  from prosperous  families”  (216)?  Was  this  not  the  case  for  Russian
revolutionaries as well? Further, his only evidence for this statement is that “in the
three biographical volumes of the Russian Jewish Encyclopaedia there are more than a
few examples” (216). The implication is that whereas Russian revolutionaries came to
the  revolution  out  of  poverty  and  destitution,  Jewish  revolutionaries  had  ulterior
motives. Similarly, he writes that “it is not without interest that in Jewish families the
departure of youth to the revolution rarely or never saw a schism between fathers and
sons… Jewish fathers often were not antagonistic at all toward the children” (217). As
evidence for this statement, Solzhenitsyn gives the example of one individual, Hertz
Lure, whose “entire family participated in the revolutionary movement of the 1870s”
(217). Does Solzhenitsyn truly believe that the thousands of Jews who abandoned the
yeshivas for  revolutionary  politics did  so  with  the  blessings  of  their  parents?  Here
Solzhenitsyn  implies  that  the  Jewish  community  as  a  whole  supported  the
revolutionary movement whereas within the Russian community it found support only
among isolated individuals acting against the will of their elders. Thus it is not only
individual Jews who are responsible for the revolution, but the Jewish community as a
whole. Even the first sentence of the book implies an intimate connection between the
revolution and the Jews:  “Through a half-century of  working on the history of  the
Russian revolution, I have many times come into contact with the question of Russian-
Jewish  relations”  (5).  Why does  he  choose  to  emphasize  the  revolution,  instead  of
simply noting Jewish involvement in Russian history as a whole? Certainly Jews played
a special role in the Russian revolutionary movement (as they did in most intellectual
and  cultural  developments  within  Russia),  but  Solzhenitsyn’s  analysis  of  this  role
provides little new information on the subject and many misleading assumptions.
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8 Throughout the book, Solzhenitsyn portrays the Jew as the oppressor and the Russian as
the victim. Not only does he amplify Jewish blame for Russian suffering,  but he also
belittles Jewish suffering within Russia. In some of these cases, Solzhenitsyn’s revisions
are  not  without  merit.  For  instance,  it  is  often  overlooked  that  the  Pale  of  Jewish
Settlement, to which most Jewish residence was restricted, actually encompassed a huge
swath  of  land  in  a  country  in  which  the  majority  of  the  population  was  not  even
permitted to leave the estate on which they were born. While it is true that the Pale was
hardly impermeable, Solzhenitsyn emphasizes the exceptions at the expense of the norm.
Solzhenitsyn is also correct to question the long-held belief that the tsarist government
was responsible for inciting the pogroms, although he is by no means the first historian
to do so.  More troubling is  his depiction of the effects of  the 1881 pogroms and the
resulting 1882 May Laws. In both cases, he argues that the number of affected individuals
was actually quite small. On this basis he questions, again as others have done before him,
the  widespread belief  that  the  pogroms were  a  turning  point  in  Jewish history.  For
instance,  when  discussing  the  effects  of  the  1881  pogroms  on  the  European  Zionist
movement, he rhetorically asks, “Was the experience of pogroms in the south of Ukraine
extended to the entire European Jewish experience?” (254) In several places he points out
that the pogroms were limited in geographic scope.  Although it  is  true that popular
memory  has  often  conflated  the  pogroms  of  1881  with  the  much  more  severe  and
widespread pogroms of the early twentieth century, one cannot measure the historical
impact of violent outbreaks solely on the basis of the number of people directly affected.
For instance, the fact that the attacks of September 11, 2001 were aimed at only two cities
and only affected some 3 000 people has hardly belittled their historical impact. Further,
it was not only the experience of the pogroms that had such a large effect on Russian
Jewry, but it was also the ambivalent reaction of the Russian liberal intelligentsia that was
an awakening for Jewish society.
9 Solzhenitsyn employs numerous techniques to distance himself from some of the more
anti-Semitic implications of his work. The first is to find Jewish sources to quote when
treading on controversial ground. Thus, the book is punctuated with phrases such as
“in the writings of Jewish authors,” or “as the Jewish Encyclopaedia explains” wherein
Solzhenitsyn airs his starkest criticisms of Jewish behaviour.  Certainly many Jewish
intellectuals whom Solzhenitsyn chooses to cite did believe that a reform of Jewish
behaviour  was  imperative,  but  many  of  these  thinkers  also  believed  that  the
responsibility for these faults lay with the Russian authorities, a fact glossed over by
Solzhenitsyn. Another technique is to use parentheses to enclose snide comments and
insinuations.  For  instance,  in  a  segment  in  which  Solzhenitsyn  congratulates  the
Russian people for not reacting to the murder of Stolypin “at the hands of a Jew” with a
pogrom, he parenthetically remarks “(although it is often written with insistence that
the  tsarist  authority  only  sought  and  dreamt  of  one  thing:  organizing  a  Jewish
pogrom)” (442).
10 The most conspicuous fault of Solzhenitsyn’s newest exploit is its lack of academic norms.
The book is based overwhelmingly on a handful of sources: Iulii  Gessen’s 1925 Istoriia
evreiskogo  naroda v  Rossii, the memoirs  of  the late nineteenth-early twentieth-century
lawyer  and  Jewish  activist  Genrikh  Borisovich  Sliozberg,  and  encyclopaedia  articles
(mostly from the Evreiskaia entsiklopediia edited by Brockhaus and Efron between 1906 and
1913). Repeatedly, Solzhenitsyn holds back his own eloquence, preferring to allow these
sources  to  articulate  ideas  in  his  place.  As  a  result,  much of  the  book consists  of  a
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stringing together of quotations that Solzhenitsyn has garnered from these sources. But
my criticism is not simply that the book is based on secondary sources; indeed, a useful
synthetic work for mass audiences would be a welcome addition to Russian-language
literature on Russian-Jewish history. Solzhenitsyn, though, does not present a synthetic
account of either traditional or recent scholarship on Russian Jewish history. Instead, he
selects only a handful of sources drawn exclusively from a small group of assimilated,
liberal,  Russophilic,  Jewish  intellectuals.  These  activists  all  sought  some  variety  of
Russian-Jewish  integration,  and  expressed  their  frustrations  with  both  the  Russian
government’s failure to expedite Jewish assimilation and the Jewish masses’ failure to
fully embrace Russia. On the other hand, primary sources more grounded in the Jewish
side are completely neglected. Even contemporary Russian-language histories accessible
to Solzhenitsyn, such as the pre-revolutionary journal of Jewish history, Evreiskaia starina,
or the numerous writings of  Simon Dubnovhardly warrant mention in Solzhenitsyn’s
book. More curious is Solzhenitsyn’s failure to consult the vast scholarship on the topic
that has been conducted in English, French, German, and Russian since the 1920s. As a
result, many of what Solzhenitsyn seems to believe are his most original arguments have
already been extensively researched and debated elsewhere. Despite his declared effort to
remain  even-handed  in  his  history,  Solzhenitsyn’s  unfamiliarity  with  the  topic  and
unwillingness  to  utilize  all  sources,  have  resulted in  a  fundamentally  one-sided  and
partial work.
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